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Equilibrium Agenda Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
  • Dutta, Bhaskar
  • Le Breton, Michele

Abstract

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known “chaos” theorems. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Suggested Citation

  • Jackson, Matthew O. & Dutta, Bhaskar & Le Breton, Michele, 2002. "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," Working Papers 1152, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1152
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1152c.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2020. "The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 133-149, April.
    3. Elizabeth Penn, 2006. "The Banks Set in Infinite Spaces," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 531-543, December.
    4. Scott Moser & John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2009. "The Structure of Heresthetical Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 139-159, April.
    5. Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 14487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. repec:esx:essedp:747 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Rafael Hortalà-Vallvé, 2010. "Qualitative Voting," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 33(92), pages 5-44, Mayo-Sept.
    8. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2002. "Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1," NBER Working Papers 8973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2009. "Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 42012, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Yukinori Iwata, 2016. "The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 535-552, November.
    11. Reuben Kline, 2014. "Supermajority voting, social indifference and status quo constraints," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(2), pages 312-330, April.
    12. Yukinori Iwata, 2023. "Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(4), pages 867-891, December.
    13. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
    14. Staudigl, Mathias & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Constrained interactions and social coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 41-63.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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