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The political economy of state responses to infectious disease

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  • Christopher J. Coyne
  • Thomas K. Duncan
  • Abigail R. Hall

Abstract

How can public policy best deal with infectious disease? In answering this question, scholarship on the optimal control of infectious disease adopts the model of a benevolent social planner who maximizes social welfare. This approach, which treats the social health planner as a unitary “public health brain” standing outside of society, removes the policymaking process from economic analysis. This paper opens the black box of the social health planner by extending the tools of economics to the policymaking process itself. We explore the nature of the economic problem facing policymakers and the epistemic constraints they face in trying to solve that problem. Additionally, we analyze the incentives facing policymakers in their efforts to address infectious diseases and consider how they affect the design and implementation of public health policy. Finally, we consider how unanticipated system effects emerge due to interventions in complex systems, and how these effects can undermine well‐intentioned efforts to improve human welfare. We illustrate the various dynamics of the political economy of state responses to infectious disease by drawing on a range of examples from the COVID‐19 pandemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. Coyne & Thomas K. Duncan & Abigail R. Hall, 2021. "The political economy of state responses to infectious disease," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1119-1137, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:87:y:2021:i:4:p:1119-1137
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12490
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    1. Dmitrii Trubnikov, 2022. "Rethinking the pandemic narrative: An ordoliberal perspective," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 327-343, June.
    2. Per L. Bylund & Mark D. Packard, 2021. "Separation of power and expertise: Evidence of the tyranny of experts in Sweden's COVID‐19 responses," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1300-1319, April.
    3. Stefanie Haeffele & Jordan K. Lofthouse & Agustin Forzani, 2023. "The Perils of Regulating COVID–19: Insights from Kirznerian Entrepreneurship and Ostromian Polycentricity," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 331-355, September.
    4. Sezer Yasar & Ceyhun Elgin, 2024. "Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 25-45, January.
    5. Virgil Henry Storr & Stefanie Haeffele & Jordan K. Lofthouse & Laura E. Grube, 2021. "Essential or not? Knowledge problems and COVID‐19 stay‐at‐home orders," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1229-1249, April.
    6. François, Abel & Gergaud, Olivier & Noury, Abdul, 2023. "Can health passport overcome political hurdles to COVID-19 vaccination?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    7. Giampaolo Garzarelli & Lyndal Keeton & Aldo A. Sitoe, 2022. "Rights redistribution and COVID-19 lockdown policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 5-36, August.
    8. Darcy W. E. Allen & Chris Berg & Sinclair Davidson & Jason Potts, 2022. "On Coase and COVID-19," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 107-125, August.
    9. Mark Pennington, 2023. "Foucault and Hayek on public health and the road to serfdom," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 125-143, April.
    10. Abishek Choutagunta & G. P. Manish & Shruti Rajagopalan, 2021. "Battling COVID‐19 with dysfunctional federalism: Lessons from India," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1267-1299, April.
    11. Algirdas Justinas Staugaitis & Bernardas Vaznonis, 2022. "Short-Term Speculation Effects on Agricultural Commodity Returns and Volatility in the European Market Prior to and during the Pandemic," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-26, April.
    12. Bryan C. McCannon & Mark Wilson, 2023. "Mask Mandates Increased COVID-19 Deaths in Kansas," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(Winter 20), pages 29-54.
    13. Lewis Davis & Stephen J. Schmidt & Sophia Zacher, 2023. "COVID on campus: An empirical analysis of COVID infection rates at U.S. colleges and universities," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(4), pages 1034-1055, April.
    14. Art Carden, 2023. "Economic planning must be polycentric, not monocentric: Introduction to a symposium on Mises and Hayek on socialism and knowledge," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 647-656, January.
    15. Glenn L. Furton, 2023. "The pox of politics: Troesken’s tradeoff reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 169-191, April.

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