The Separation of Spending from Taxation: Implications for Collective Choices
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- Michael Marlow, 1992. "Intergovernmental competition, voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 73-88, December.
- Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley, 1984. "A positive model of tax structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 67-87, June.
- William Hunter & Michael Nelson, 1989. "Interest group demand for taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 41-61, July.
- Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe, 1990. " Redistributive Politics: A Theory of Taxation for an Incumbent in a Democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 135-53, February.
- James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457.
- Michael Marlow & William Orzechowski, 1988. "Controlling leviathan through tax reduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 237-245, September.
- Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Collective Choice and General Fund Financing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 377-90, April.
- Orzechowski, William, 1991. " Reaganomics and the Use of Collective Rebates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 311-22, March.
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