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On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result

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  • Robert Mackay
  • Carolyn Weaver

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  • Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1979. "On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 481-491, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:3:p:481-491
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00225683
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    2. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(5), pages 457-457.
    3. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Collective Choice and General Fund Financing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 377-390, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Ingberman, 1985. "Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 19-43, January.
    2. Bruce L. Benson, 1983. "“High Demand†Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(3), pages 259-281, July.
    3. Cheryl L. Eavey & Gary J. Miller, 1995. "Subcommittee Agenda Control," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 125-156, April.
    4. Bruce Benson, 1983. "Logrolling and high demand committee review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 427-434, January.
    5. Jane Leuthold, 1988. "A forecasting model for state expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 45-55, January.
    6. Allan Feldman, 1985. "A model of majority voting and growth in government expenditure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 3-17, January.
    7. Michael Munger, 1984. "On the mutuality of interest between bureaus and high demand review committees: The case of joint production," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 211-215, January.

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