Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
Stylized institutions for direct democracy referenda are examined in a dynamic full information environment with myopic voters. Competitive-agenda (median-voter) processes are contrasted with monopolistic (controlled-agenda) processes by extending existing static analyses to a class of dynamic institutions not previously characterized, the status quo reversion rule. This highlights the dependence of the progression of real equilibrium allocations over time on institutional structure. By delineating the restrictions implied by each institutional form the model explains some persistent empirical regularities. In particular, a strict ceteris paribus ordering of the magnitudes of budgets by institutional form is derived for a wide portion of the parameter space. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
- Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Denzau, Arthur T. & Parks, Robert P., 1979.
"Deriving public sector preferences,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 335-352, June.
- Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
- Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-78, October.
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:1:p:19-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.