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Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time

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  • Daniel Ingberman

Abstract

Stylized institutions for direct democracy referenda are examined in a dynamic full information environment with myopic voters. Competitive-agenda (median-voter) processes are contrasted with monopolistic (controlled-agenda) processes by extending existing static analyses to a class of dynamic institutions not previously characterized, the status quo reversion rule. This highlights the dependence of the progression of real equilibrium allocations over time on institutional structure. By delineating the restrictions implied by each institutional form the model explains some persistent empirical regularities. In particular, a strict ceteris paribus ordering of the magnitudes of budgets by institutional form is derived for a wide portion of the parameter space. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Ingberman, 1985. "Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 19-43, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:1:p:19-43
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00150961
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:02:p:297-322_24 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
    3. Denzau, Arthur T. & Parks, Robert P., 1979. "Deriving public sector preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 335-352, June.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    6. Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
    7. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-578, October.
    8. Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2001. "Order-restricted preferences and strategy-proof social choices rules," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 191, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. Barseghyan, Levon & Coate, Stephen, 2014. "Bureaucrats, voters, and public investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 35-48.
    3. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June.
    4. Daniel E. Ingberman & Robert P. Inman, 1987. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 2405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hensher, David A. & Li, Zheng, 2013. "Referendum voting in road pricing reform: A review of the evidence," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 186-197.

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