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“High Demand†Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output

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  • Bruce L. Benson

    (Montana State University)

Abstract

Niskanen contended that “high demand†committee review increases bureaucratic output, and the bureau appropriates the entire gain from expansion. This is inconsistent with the political behavior underlying Niskanen's analysis. The committee review system is designed to facilitate logrolling, so many of the benefits of overproduction must flow to legislators' constituencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce L. Benson, 1983. "“High Demand†Legislative Committees and Bureaucratic Output," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(3), pages 259-281, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:11:y:1983:i:3:p:259-281
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218301100301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arleen Leibowitz & Robert Tollison, 1980. "A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(2), pages 261-277.
    2. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 257-286, January.
    3. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
    4. Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1979. "On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 481-491, September.
    5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
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