A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules
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- Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006. "The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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