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Why Are Bad Products So Hard to Kill?

Author

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  • Duncan Simester

    (Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142)

  • Juanjuan Zhang

    (Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142)

Abstract

It is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low. We argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers' incentives. Rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low. To avoid investing in low-demand products, the firm must also reward decisions to kill products. However, rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success. The inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low-demand products. We explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Duncan Simester & Juanjuan Zhang, 2010. "Why Are Bad Products So Hard to Kill?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(7), pages 1161-1179, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:56:y:2010:i:7:p:1161-1179
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1169
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Daspit, Joshua J. & Long, Rebecca G. & Pearson, Allison W., 2019. "How familiness affects innovation outcomes via absorptive capacity: A dynamic capability perspective of the family firm," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 133-143.
    7. Li, Yanran & Li, Bo & Wang, Minxue & Liu, Yang, 2023. "Optimal sales strategies for an omni-channel manufacturer in livestreaming demonstration trends," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    8. Shivam Gupta & Anupam Agrawal & Jennifer K. Ryan, 2023. "Agile contracting: Managing incentives under uncertain needs," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(3), pages 972-988, March.
    9. Liang Guo & Juanjuan Zhang, 2012. "Consumer Deliberation and Product Line Design," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 995-1007, November.
    10. Anja Schöttner, 2017. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1529-1544, May.
    11. Yan Dong & Yuliang Yao & Tony Haitao Cui, 2011. "When Acquisition Spoils Retention: Direct Selling vs. Delegation Under CRM," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(7), pages 1288-1299, July.
    12. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
    13. Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2013. "Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2490-2501, November.
    14. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    16. Juanjuan Zhang, 2016. "Deadlines in Product Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3310-3326, November.
    17. Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2020. "Delegating Pricing Authority to Sales Agents: The Impact of Kickbacks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2686-2705, June.
    18. Ying Bao & Mengze Shi & Ajay Kalra, 2022. "Designing Product Development Contracts in the Presence of Managerial Lobbying," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6797-6818, September.
    19. Xiaoyang Long & Javad Nasiry & Yaozhong Wu, 2020. "A Behavioral Study on Abandonment Decisions in Multistage Projects," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1999-2016, May.

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