Why Are Bad Products So Hard to Kill?
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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1169
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- Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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Keywords
product development; managerial incentives; moral hazard; adverse selection; information acquisition;All these keywords.
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