Sticking to fiscal plans: the role of institutions
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More about this item
KeywordsEMU; Fiscal institutions; Fiscal policy; Stability and convergence programs; Stability and growth pact; H62; H63; H87;
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
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