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Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?

  • Ringa Raudla


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    Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 201-221

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:30:y:2010:i:3:p:201-221
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