Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach
We test for the influence of government strength and dispersion of power among the parties of coalition governments on the size of annual debt accumulation through budget deficits in OECD-countries from 1970 to 1999. Government strength and power dispersion in coalition governments are measured by the Banzhaf index of voting power, respectively the standard deviation of Banzhaf indices of coalition parties. We believe that these are better-suited proxies than most of what has been applied so far. Government strength turns out to be insignificant. However, coalitions with equally strong partners run significantly higher deficits than coalitions with one dominating party. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 116 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
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