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Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach

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  • Huber, Gerald
  • Kocher, Martin
  • Sutter, Matthias

Abstract

We test for the influence of government strength and dispersion of power among the parties of coalition governments on the size of annual debt accumulation through budget deficits in OECD-countries from 1970 to 1999. Government strength and power dispersion in coalition governments are measured by the Banzhaf index of voting power, respectively the standard deviation of Banzhaf indices of coalition parties. We believe that these are better-suited proxies than most of what has been applied so far. Government strength turns out to be insignificant. However, coalitions with equally strong partners run significantly higher deficits than coalitions with one dominating party. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Huber, Gerald & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries: A Voting Power Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 333-350, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:3-4:p:333-50
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    1. repec:wsi:jicepx:v:08:y:2017:i:01:n:s1793993317500041 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ricardo Nunes & Davide Debortoli, 2007. "Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 725, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Government weakness and electoral cycles in local public debt: evidence from Flemish municipalities
      [Regierungsschwäche und Wahlzyklen in Zeiten kommunaler Verschuldung: das Beispiel flämischer Kom
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. Ana Barreira & Rui Nuno Baleiras, "undated". "Cycles On Public Expenditure Composition Within the European Union," Regional and Urban Modeling 283600004, EcoMod.
    5. Ibrahim Tutar & Aysit Tansel, 2012. "An Analysis Of Political And Institutional Power Dispersion: The Case Of Turkey," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 548-565, October.
    6. Roel Beetsma & Koen Vermeylen, 2007. "The effect of monetary unification on public debt and its real return," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 393-415, December.
    7. Markus Ahlborn & Rainer Schweickert, 2018. "Public debt and economic growth – economic systems matter," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 373-403, April.
    8. Marek Hanusch, 2012. "Coalition incentives for political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 121-136, April.
    9. Maria Antoinette Silgoner & Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma & Gerhard Reitschuler, 2003. "The Fiscal Smile; The Effectiveness and Limits of Fiscal Stabilizers," IMF Working Papers 03/182, International Monetary Fund.
    10. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2005. "Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 395-422, August.
    11. Maxime MENUET, 2016. "Is a Long War Desirable ? Optimal Debt Concessions In Attrition Warfare," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2367, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    12. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
    13. Ivo Bischoff & Wolfgang Gohout, 2010. "The political economy of tax projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 133-150, April.
    14. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    15. Yesim Kustepeli & Gülcan Önel, 2005. "The Effects of Political Fragmentation on Fiscal Deficits in Turkey," Discussion Paper Series 05/02, Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Business, Department of Economics, revised 23 Nov 2005.
    16. Maria Silgoner & Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Gerhard Reitschuler, 2004. "The fiscal smile - on the effectiveness and limits of fiscal stabilizers," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 87, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    17. Sutter, Matthias, 2003. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Deficits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 313-332, September.
    18. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2014. "Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 253-278, September.
    19. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2006. "Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 383-405, September.

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