Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government
Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Elgie & Iain McMenamin, 2008. "Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 255-267, September.
- Dani Rodrik, 1998.
"Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," NBER Working Papers 5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 2007.
"Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science,
now publishers, vol. 2(2), pages 155-188, May.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000249, David K. Levine.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000706, David K. Levine.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000880, David K. Levine.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000024, David K. Levine.
- Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vito Tanzi, 2005. "The Economic Role Of The State In The 21st Century," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 25(3), pages 617-638, Fall.
- Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2007.
"The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2017, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf, 2009. "The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 197-225, April.
- de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Beekhuis, Geert, 1999. " The Weak Government Thesis: Some New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(3-4), pages 163-76, December.
- Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 365-388, 03.
- Levmore, Saul, 1992. "Bicameralism: When are two decisions better than one?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 145-162, June.
- Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. " Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December.
- John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain, 2002. "Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 646-659, January.
- Kjell Hausken & Christian W. Martin & Thomas Plümper, 2004. "Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-259, 09.
- Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
- Tanzi, Vito & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1997. "Reconsidering the Fiscal Role of Government: The International Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 164-68, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:3:p:415-433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.