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Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules

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  • Nicolas Faysse

Abstract

. The paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of New Institutional Economics analyses investigating a common‐pool resource setting, with a specific focus on game theory models. Most of the studies have used a noncooperative approach in order to explain how under‐provision for the resource or its over‐use – the so‐called Tragedy of the Commons – can be avoided, within given management rules. They show how the characteristics of the game (payoff matrix, repetition) or of the users (group size, wealth, heterogeneity and moral norms) may give incentives for the latter to play in a way that benefits all users. By contrast, much fewer articles have used a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to design new rules to overcome the initial Tragedy of the Commons. The article ends with some proposals of directions for future research.

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  • Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:19:y:2005:i:2:p:239-261
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00246.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ruttan, Lore M., 2008. "Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective Action and Collective Goods Provisioning," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 969-985, May.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    3. Ana Paula Martins, 2012. "Calls and Couples: Communication, Connections, Joint-Consumption and Transfer Prices," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(2), pages 237-281, November.
    4. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, July.
    5. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    6. Matthew Freeman & Christopher Anderson, 2013. "Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 399-414, November.
    7. Yuriy Mishchenko, 2014. "Oscillations in Rational Economies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(2), pages 1-6, February.
    8. Josemiguel Lana Berasain & Miguel Laborda Pemán, 2013. "El anidamiento institucional y su dinámica histórica en comunidades rurales complejas. Dos estudios de caso (Navarra, siglos XIV-XX)," Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria 1307, Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria.
    9. Christoph Buehren & Astrid Dannenberg, 2020. "The Demand for Punishment to Promote Cooperation Among Like-Minded People," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202044, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    10. Claudius Gros, 2022. "Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource," Papers 2208.08171, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    11. Ylkilic, Rahmi, 2008. "Network of Commons," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 6221, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Tanja Baerlein & Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2015. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, January.
    13. Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013. "Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 463-467.
    14. Bühren, Christoph & Dannenberg, Astrid, 2021. "The Demand for Punishment to Promote Cooperation Among Like-Minded People," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242427, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Stefan Mann & Andrei Stoinescu, 2021. "Exploring Draheim's three dimensions of success in cooperative organizations—the case of collective Alpine summer farms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(4), pages 587-602, December.
    16. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    17. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Elinor Ostrom, 2014. "Do institutions for collective action evolve?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 3-30, April.
    19. Kanjilal, Kiriti & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2018. "Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares," Working Papers 2018-4, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    20. Yasuyuki Sawada & Ryuji Kasahara & Keitaro Aoyagi & Masahiro Shoji & Mika Ueyama, 2013. "Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 30(1), pages 31-51, March.
    21. Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2011. "Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 402-413.
    22. Bühren, Christoph & Dannenberg, Astrid, 2021. "The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    23. Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "Entry Deterrence in the Commons with Multiple Incumbents," Working Papers 2012-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    24. Rahmi Ilkiliç, 2008. "Network of Commons," Working Papers 2008.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    25. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2022. "Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies," Working Papers 2022-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

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