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A Fiscal Theory of Government's Role in Money

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  • Selgin, George
  • White, Lawrence H

Abstract

As an alternative to market failure explanations, the authors draw on theory and historical evidence to argue that fiscal considerations explain the roles governments typically play in producing and regulating money. Public monopoly production of coins and banknotes, substitution of fiat for commodity standards, and restrictions on substitutes for government money all generate revenue and especially provide means for meeting fiscal emergencies. The authors argue that these arrangements do not reflect conscious design so much as the evolutionary survival of the fiscally advantageous. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Selgin, George & White, Lawrence H, 1999. "A Fiscal Theory of Government's Role in Money," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 154-165, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:154-65
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    Cited by:

    1. Karaman, K. Kıvanç & Pamuk, Şevket & Yıldırım-Karaman, Seçil, 2020. "Money and monetary stability in Europe, 1300–1914," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 279-300.
    2. Miller, Stephen Matteo, 2016. "When and why hyperinflating monetary authorities abandon a currency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 11-14.
    3. Louis Rouanet, 2021. "The interest group origins of the Bank of France," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 119-140, January.
    4. George Selgin, 2012. "Mere quibbles: Bagus and Howden’s critique of the theory of free banking," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 131-148, June.
    5. Alexander Fink, 2014. "Free banking as an evolving system: The case of Switzerland reconsidered," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 57-69, March.
    6. Jackson Mejia & Brian C. Albrecht, 2022. "On price stability with a job guarantee," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 568-584, October.
    7. Pablo Paniagua, 2017. "The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 231-256, September.
    8. Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    9. Lawrence H. White, 2022. "The private mint in economics: evidence from the American gold rushes," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(1), pages 3-21, February.
    10. van Riet Ad, 2019. "Monetary Policy and Unnatural Low Interest Rates: Secular Stagnation or Financial Repression?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 70(2), pages 99-135, August.
    11. Nicholas A. Curott & Tyler Watts & Benjamin R. Thrasher, 2020. "Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 17(1), pages 1-98–151, March.
    12. George Selgin, 2003. "Adaptive Learning and the Transition to Fiat Money," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 147-165, January.

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