Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects An axiomatic characterization
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal "profits" according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
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- Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. " The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-53, June.
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