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"One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • Anastasios Koukoumelis

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

Abstract

We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair "provision point" mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public projects should be implemented. We also run control treatments where only one of the two projects can be implemented. We find that (a) mixed feelings per se do not affect bidding behavior, and (b) the provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines significantly when it faces competition from the public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati, 2011. ""One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-034
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    File URL: https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2011/wp_2011_034.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Charles Cadsby & Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks & Elizabeth Maynes, 2008. "Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 277-289, June.
    6. Spencer, Michael A. & Swallow, Stephen K. & Shogren, Jason F. & List, John A., 2009. "Rebate rules in threshold public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 798-806, June.
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    10. Marks, Melanie & Croson, Rachel, 1998. "Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 195-220, February.
    11. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2011. "Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects An axiomatic characterization," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    3. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
    4. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Providing negative cost public projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-021, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Simona Cicognani & Anna D’Ambrosio & Werner Güth & Simone Pfuderer & Matteo Ploner, 2015. "Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 109-132, January.
    6. Güth, Werner & Koukoumelis, Anastasios & Levati, M. Vittoria & Ploner, Matteo, 2014. "Providing revenue-generating projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 410-419.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public project; Bidding behavior; Procedural fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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