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The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation

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  • Groothuis, Peter A.
  • Whitehead, John C.

Abstract

The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates.

Suggested Citation

  • Groothuis, Peter A. & Whitehead, John C., 2009. "The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 38(2), October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:55542
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Franco & Luca Luiselli, 2013. "A procedure to analyse the strategic outliers and the multiple motivations in a contingent valuation: A case study for a concrete policy purpose," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 40(3), pages 246-266, February.
    2. Peter A. Groothuis & Tanga M. Mohr & John C. Whitehead & Kristan Cockerill, 2015. "Payment and Policy Consequentiality in Contingent Valuation," Working Papers 15-04, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    provision point mechanism; contingent valuation; willingness to pay; public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects

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