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The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation

  • Groothuis, Peter A.
  • Whitehead, John C.

The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates.

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Article provided by Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association in its journal Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)

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Handle: RePEc:ags:arerjl:55542
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