Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis
Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect voluntary producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggest that producer referenda play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a provision point mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 87 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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