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Designing a Voluntary Beef Checkoff

Author

Listed:
  • Norwood, F. Bailey
  • Winn, Chris
  • Chung, Chanjin
  • Ward, Clement E.

Abstract

Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory fees imposed by the beef checkoff violates the First Amendment. As a precaution, many states began forming voluntary beef checkoffs, where funds would be raised through voluntary contributions. This study conducted a survey of Oklahoma cattle producers to determine what type ofvoluntary checkoff design would receive the greatest support. The most popular checkoff placed a large emphasis on advertising and a slightly lower checkoff fee. The survey also tested the ability of a provision point mechanism to limit free-riding. The mechanism was not as effective as in other studies which used laboratory experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Norwood, F. Bailey & Winn, Chris & Chung, Chanjin & Ward, Clement E., 2006. "Designing a Voluntary Beef Checkoff," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(01), pages 1-19, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:10149
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10149
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 215-233, February.
    2. Winn, Chris & Norwood, F. Bailey & Chung, Chanjin & Ward, Clement E., 2004. "Surveying the Feasibility of a Voluntary Beef Checkoff," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20385, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    Cited by:

    1. Groothuis, Peter A. & Whitehead, John C., 2009. "The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 271-280, October.
    2. Schumacher, Tucker & Schroeder, Ted C. & Tonsor, Glynn T., 2012. "Willingness-to-Pay for Calf Health Programs and Certification Agents," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 191-202, May.
    3. Lee L. Schulz & Glynn T. Tonsor, 2010. "Cow‐Calf Producer Preferences for Voluntary Traceability Systems," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 138-162, February.
    4. Ortega, David L. & Wang, H. Holly & Olynk Widmar, Nicole J. & Wu, Laping, 2014. "Reprint of “Chinese producer behavior: Aquaculture farmers in southern China”," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 540-547.
    5. Ortega, David L. & Wang, H. Holly & Olynk Widmar, Nicole J. & Wu, Laping, 2014. "Chinese producer behavior: Aquaculture farmers in southern China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 17-24.

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