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Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • Hartmut Kliemt

    (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)

  • Anastasios Koukoumelis

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena and Department of Economics, University of Verona)

  • Matteo Ploner

    (DECO-CEEL, University of Trento)

Abstract

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects pro- vision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-034
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    File URL: http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2013/wp_2013_034.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglass C. North, 1988. "Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 15-28, Spring/Su.
    2. Hume, David, 1740. "A Treatise of Human Nature (III) Of Morals," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 3, number hume1740.
    3. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Providing negative cost public projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-021, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
    5. Smith, Vernon L, 1977. "The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent in Social Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1125-1139, December.
    6. Hume, David, 1739. "A Treatise of Human Nature (I) Of the Understanding," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 1, number hume1739.
    7. Hume, David, 1739. "A Treatise of Human Nature (II) Of the Passions," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 2, number hume1739a.
    8. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati, 2011. ""One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-230, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Güth, Werner, 2014. "Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 389-395.
    2. Werner Güth, 2015. "Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 23-31, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public project; Bidding behavior; Procedural fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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