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Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways

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  • Werner Güth

Abstract

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates due to their idiosyncratic concerns for the various qualities of the candidates. Our ranking mechanism asks all evaluators to submit individual bids assigning a monetary amount for each possible rank order. The rules specify for all possible vectors of such individual bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments, due to the different evaluators. Three requirements uniquely determine procedurally fair ranking rules as a game form. Only when additionally assuming exogenously given true evaluations of collective rankings, which may be commonly or only privately known, and—in case of private information—beliefs concerning the evaluations by others, this game form determines proper games and allows for (game theoretic) equilibrium analysis. After an illustration, the approach is adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable sets of candidates thus rendering the mechanism even more attractive. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth, 2015. "Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 23-31, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:78:y:2015:i:1:p:23-31
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9412-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social ranking; Fairness; Fair game forms; Objective equality; Mechanism design; Committee decision making; C70; C72; D63; D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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