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Lying, Spying, Sabotaging -- Balancing Means and Aims --

Author

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  • Chlaß, Nadine
  • Riener, Gerhard

Abstract

We study individuals who can nudge themselves out of, or opt into a set of rules which either allows them to spy on an opponent, or to sabotage an opponent, or to fabricate payoff-relevant information on the opponent s moves. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules which allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying. We provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern about the rules of the game. How individuals deal with this concern whether they prefer to nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether they assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent for the rules of the game by giving all payoff away varies along with individuals attitudes toward power.

Suggested Citation

  • Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, Spying, Sabotaging -- Balancing Means and Aims --," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113222, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113222
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/113222/1/VfS_2015_pid_768.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John P. Lightle, 2014. "The Paternalistic Bias of Expert Advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 876-898, December.
    2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews & John Schirm, 2010. "Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 504-517, March.
    3. Chlaß, Nadine & Güth, Werner & Miettinen, Topi, 2019. "Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 108-128.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
    5. Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz, 2014. "The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 2005-2039, November.
    6. Miettinen, Topi, 2013. "Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 68-84.
    7. Sebald, Alexander, 2010. "Attribution and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 339-352, January.
    8. Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence From Individuals and Teams," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 47-60, January.
    9. Chiharu Ishida, 2006. "How do Scores of DIT and MJT Differ? A Critical Assessment of the Use of Alternative Moral Development Scales in Studies of Business Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 63-74, August.
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    11. Raúl López-Pérez & Eli Spiegelman, 2013. "Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 233-247, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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