Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
|Date of creation:||13 Aug 2009|
|Date of revision:||20 Oct 2014|
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