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Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity

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  • Chlaß, Nadine
  • Güth, Werner
  • Miettinen, Topi

Abstract

We conduct experiments in which parties face a pair of two-player pie-splitting procedures. Parties submit their strategy in each, their beliefs about their opponent's choices, and are also asked whether they prefer one procedure over the other. The procedures – a yes-no game, an ultimatum game, and a dictator game – are designed such that by all existing economic preference models, whether distributive or procedural, parties should be indifferent between them. In particular, the procedures should yield the same outcomes, the same expected outcomes and carry the same information on parties' intentions. At the same time, the procedures differ in the way they distribute decision and information rights across players, and also in their complexity and efficiency. Experimentally, parties do indeed still reveal preferences over the procedures at hand. To explore why this happens, we elicit individuals' simplicity and efficiency ratings of the procedures, and also the degree by which individuals invoke the equality of basic rights and liberties in their moral judgement – an ethical criterion not yet captured by any preference model. The preferences we find link to this data. We explore formalizations for such preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Chlaß, Nadine & Güth, Werner & Miettinen, Topi, 2019. "Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 108-128.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:108-128
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.02.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, Spying, Sabotaging -- Balancing Means and Aims --," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113222, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Güth, Werner, 2014. "Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 389-395.
    3. Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, spying, sabotaging : procedures and consequences," Working Papers 15-17, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    4. Nadine Chlaß & Peter G. Moffatt, 2017. "Giving in Dictator Games - Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 433-450, September.
    6. Nadine Chlaß & Lata Gangadharan & Kristy Jones, 2015. "Charitable Giving and Intermediation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2014. "Discriminatory taxes are unpopular—Even when they are efficient and distributionally fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 463-476.
    8. André Schmelzer, 2016. "Single versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_08, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Mar 2017.
    9. Mertins Vanessa & Albert Max, 2015. "Does Participation Increase Outcome Acceptance? Evidence from a Power-to-take Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(6), pages 584-607, December.
    10. Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2014. "On the fairness of random procedures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 168-170.
    11. Dold, Malte & Khadjavi, Menusch, 2017. "Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 127-137.
    12. Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2015. "Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-105/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2015. "Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series 5509, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procedural preferences; Equality of rights; Experiment; Institutional design;

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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