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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

  • Abigail Barr

    ()

  • Danila Serra

    ()

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.� When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered.� Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance.� However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 488-503

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:12:y:2009:i:4:p:488-503
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

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