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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

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  • Abigail Barr
  • Danila Serra

Abstract

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.
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Suggested Citation

  • Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2009. "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 488-503, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:12:y:2009:i:4:p:488-503
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Economic experiment; Social preferences; D73; C91; Z13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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