Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis
Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not? Do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions? In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country, Among graduates we could no. In 2007, we replicated our result. We conclude that individuals’ propensities to act corruptly may reflect the cultures in which they grew up. However certain types of individuals may not conform to their cultures and could, therefore, act as agents for change.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ|
Phone: +44-(0)1865 271084
Fax: +44-(0)1865 281447
Web page: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
- Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2002.
"An Experimental Bribery Game,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 428-454, October.
- Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2000. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1389, Econometric Society.
- Abbink, Klaus & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 1999. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Discussion Paper Serie B 459, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
- Posner, R.A. & Rasmusen, E., 1998.
"Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions,"
98-005, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Richard Posner & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions," Law and Economics 9907004, EconWPA.
- Sáez Martí, María & Hauk, Esther, 1998.
"On the cultural transmission of corruption,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
4143, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Hauk, Esther & Sáez-Martí, María, 2001. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Working Paper Series 564, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Esther Hauk & Maria Sáez, 1999. "On the cultural transmission of corruption," Economics Working Papers 392, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Klaus Abbink, 2000. "Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Amir N. Licht & Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, 2003.
"Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
2003-605, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Licht, Amir N. & Goldschmidt, Chanan & Schwartz, Shalom H., 2007. "Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-688, December.
- Posner, Richard A. & Rasmusen, Eric B., 1999. "Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 369-382, September.
- Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June.
- Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales & Luigi Guiso, 2006.
"Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?,"
NBER Working Papers
11999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2009. "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 488-503, December.
- Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 1998. "Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-37, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
- Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Laboratory experiments on corruption," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-38, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
- Cameron, Lisa & Chaudhuri, Ananish & Erkal, Nisvan & Gangadharan, Lata, 2009. "Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 843-851, August.
- Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
- Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2007. "Social Attitudes and Macroeconomic Performance:," 2007 Meeting Papers 414, Society for Economic Dynamics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2008-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Payne)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.