IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/anr/reveco/v6y2014p103-128.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Belief Elicitation in the Laboratory

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Schotter

    () (Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10012)

  • Isabel Trevino

    (Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10012)

Abstract

One constraint we face as economists is not being able to observe all the relevant variables required to test our theories or make policy prescriptions. Laboratory techniques allow us to convert many variables (such as beliefs) that are unobservable in the field into observables. This article presents a survey of the literature on belief elicitation in laboratory experimental economics. We discuss several techniques available to elicit beliefs in an incentive-compatible manner and the problems involved in their use. We then look at how successful these techniques have been when employed in laboratory studies. We find that despite some problems, beliefs elicited in the laboratory are meaningful (i.e., they are generally used as the basis for behavior), and the process of eliciting beliefs seems not to be too intrusive. One hope for the future is that by eliciting beliefs, we may be able to develop better theories of belief formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Schotter & Isabel Trevino, 2014. "Belief Elicitation in the Laboratory," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 103-128, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:6:y:2014:p:103-128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040927
    Download Restriction: Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; decision theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:6:y:2014:p:103-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (http://www.annualreviews.org). General contact details of provider: http://www.annualreviews.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.