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Two are Better Than One! Individuals' Contributions to "Unpacked" Public Goods

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We study the effects on voluntary contributions of unpacking a single linear public good into distinct but identical parts. In our experiment, subjects either participate to a one linear public good game or a two linear and identical public goods game, with marginal per capita returns of contributions being constant across treatments. We find that unpacking public goods significantly increases contributions of both unexperienced and experienced subjects. Our results highlight new strategies for NGOs for increasing charitable donations.

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  • Michele Bernasconi, Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal., 2007. "Two are Better Than One! Individuals' Contributions to "Unpacked" Public Goods," ISLA Working Papers 30, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:slp:islawp:islawp30
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary contributions to public goods; unpacking effect; laboratory experiment; charitable donations.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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