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Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game

Author

Listed:
  • Hyoyoung Kim

    (Sogang University)

  • Doruk İriş

    (Sogang University)

  • Jinkwon Lee

    (Sogang University)

  • Alessandro Tavoni

    (University of Bologna
    London School of Economics)

Abstract

In our repeated public goods experiment, randomly chosen representatives make decisions on contributions and punishment for both themselves and their team. Confirming previous findings, punishment prevents the decline to the zero-contribution Nash Equilibrium. With punishment, contributions range from 50 to 80%, compared to approximately 30% without it. We also observe a nuanced interplay between hierarchical decision-making and punishment on public good provision. Compared to self-representation, the positive contribution trend is less pronounced when representatives govern the entire team, especially when non-representatives cannot signal preferences, resulting in contributions plateauing around 50% of the endowment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyoyoung Kim & Doruk İriş & Jinkwon Lee & Alessandro Tavoni, 2025. "Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 88(5), pages 1407-1433, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:88:y:2025:i:5:d:10.1007_s10640-025-00970-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-025-00970-6
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Representations; Peer Pressure; Punishment; Public Goods game; Lab Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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