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Power comes with responsibility—or does it?

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  • Friedel Bolle
  • Claudia Vogel

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Friedel Bolle & Claudia Vogel, 2011. "Power comes with responsibility—or does it?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 459-470, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:459-470
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9665-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Werner G³th & Manfred K÷nigstein & NadÞge Marchand & Klaus Nehring, 2001. "Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 241-262.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    3. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
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    7. Gächter, Simon & Orzen, Henrik & Renner, Elke & Starmer, Chris, 2009. "Are experimental economists prone to framing effects? A natural field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 443-446, June.
    8. Cameron, Lisa & Chaudhuri, Ananish & Erkal, Nisvan & Gangadharan, Lata, 2009. "Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 843-851, August.
    9. Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
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    11. Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. "Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 305-327, March.
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    13. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
    14. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
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    16. C. Monica Capra, 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June.
    17. Dollar, David & Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2001. "Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 423-429, December.
    18. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fredrik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi & Maria Vittoria Levati, 2015. "Doing good with other people’s money: an experiment on people's (un)willingness to grant others the freedom to choose," Working Papers 08/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Karen Evelyn Hauge & Ole Rogeberg, 2015. "Representing Others in a Public Good Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(3), pages 1-13, September.
    3. Fabio Galeotti & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Competence versus Honesty : What Do Voters Care About ?," Working Papers 1520, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Philipp E. Otto & Friedel Bolle, 2016. "Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 187-205, September.
    5. Lübbe, Ingmar & Bolle, Friedel, 2011. "Who helps whom? Risk taking and solidarity in a virtual world experiment," Discussion Papers 310, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    6. Martin G. Kocher & Fangfang Tan & Jing Yu, 2014. "Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-12_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    7. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2014. "Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 155-168.
    8. Frederik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi & M. Vittoria Levati, 2010. "Doing good with other people's money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-089, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Jürgen Fleiß & Stefan Palan, 2013. "Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 1-24, October.
    10. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2017. "The flip side of power," Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 26, RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder).
    11. Otto, Philipp E. & Bolle, Friedel, 2016. "The advantage of hierarchy: Inducing responsibility and selecting ability?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 49-57.
    12. Markussen, Thomas & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2017. "Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 204-218.
    13. Marco Faillo & Federico Fornasari & Luigi Mittone, 2016. "Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership, Delegation, and Voice in Cooperation," CEEL Working Papers 1604, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Responsibility; Public Good game; Experiments; D61; H41;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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