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Power comes with responsibility—or does it?

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  • Friedel Bolle
  • Claudia Vogel

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  • Friedel Bolle & Claudia Vogel, 2011. "Power comes with responsibility—or does it?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 459-470, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:459-470
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9665-y
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    9. Martijn Egas & Arno Riedl, 2005. "The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-065/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 51-68, January.
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    13. Cameron, Lisa & Chaudhuri, Ananish & Erkal, Nisvan & Gangadharan, Lata, 2009. "Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 843-851, August.
    14. Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
    15. Gürerk, Özgür & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rockenbach, Bettina, 2009. "Motivating teammates: The leader's choice between positive and negative incentives," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 591-607, August.
    16. Dollar, David & Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2001. "Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 423-429, December.
    17. Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A., 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation," Scholarly Articles 3804483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    18. Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. "Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 305-327, March.
    19. Kritikos, Alexander & Bolle, Friedel, 2001. "Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 333-338, December.
    20. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fredrik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi & Maria Vittoria Levati, 2015. "Doing good with other people’s money: an experiment on people's (un)willingness to grant others the freedom to choose," Working Papers 08/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Karen Evelyn Hauge & Ole Rogeberg, 2015. "Representing Others in a Public Good Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-13, September.
    3. Fabio Galeotti & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Competence versus Honesty : What Do Voters Care About ?," Working Papers 1520, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Philipp E. Otto & Friedel Bolle, 2016. "Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 187-205, September.
    5. Martin G. Kocher & Fangfang Tan & Jing Yu, 2018. "Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation And Cooperation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 381-397, January.
    6. Martin G. Kocher & Fangfang Tan & Jing Yu, 2018. "Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation And Cooperation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 381-397, January.
    7. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2022. "The flip side of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 75-92, January.
    8. Otto, Philipp E. & Bolle, Friedel, 2016. "The advantage of hierarchy: Inducing responsibility and selecting ability?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 49-57.
    9. Markussen, Thomas & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2017. "Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 204-218.
    10. Hoeft, Leonard & Mill, Wladislaw, 2024. "Abuse of power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 305-324.
    11. repec:grz:wpsses:2012-03 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2014. "Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 155-168.
    13. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2020. "Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 150-172.
    14. Lübbe, Ingmar & Bolle, Friedel, 2011. "Who helps whom? Risk taking and solidarity in a virtual world experiment," Discussion Papers 310, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    15. Frederik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi & M. Vittoria Levati, 2010. "Doing good with other people's money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-089, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    16. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2019. "Disincentive Effects of Evaluation," Working Paper 1410, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    17. Galeotti, Fabio & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2018. "Identifying voter preferences: The trade-off between honesty and competence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 27-50.
    18. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Tommaso Reggiani, 2020. "Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1030-1068, December.
    19. Brock V. Stoddard & Caleb A. Cox & James M. Walker, 2021. "Incentivizing provision of collective goods: Allocation rules," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(4), pages 1345-1365, April.
    20. Marco Faillo & Federico Fornasari & Luigi Mittone, 2016. "Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership, Delegation, and Voice in Cooperation," CEEL Working Papers 1604, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Responsibility; Public Good game; Experiments; D61; H41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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