Minimum wages and excessive effort supply
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers' future rents to induce excessively high effort.
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- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
- Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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