Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low e?ort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workersâ€™ future rents to induce excessively high effort.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005.
"Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages,"
Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:264. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.