Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence
We investigate two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a firm’s long-term wage policy. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second claims that bonuses act as complements to an executive’s internal career. Our data show that throughout the whole chemical industry sector, bonus payments are mostly prevalent among the most senior executives and for management jobs rather than for jobs in research and development. The findings indicate that the two theoretical views are not mutually exclusive, but are both relevant in practice.
Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 0049 89 2180 2166
Fax: 0049 89 2180 6327
Web page: http://www.sbr-online.com
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pedro Ortín-Ángel & Vicente Salas-fumás, 1998. "Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 573-613, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:64:y:2012:i:2:p:101-124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (sbr)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.