Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1719
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- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium; renegotation; repeated Bertrand games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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