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Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model

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  • Aramendia, Miguel
  • Larrea, Concepcion
  • Ruiz, Luis

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  • Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis, 2005. "Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-19, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:1:p:1-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
    2. Segerstrom, Paul S., 1988. "Demons and repentance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 32-52, June.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    4. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    5. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    6. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
    7. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andersson Ola & Wengström Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2016. "Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion," Working Paper Series 08716, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
    3. Montizaan, Raymond & Cörvers, Frank & de Grip, Andries & Dohmen, Thomas, 2012. "Negative Reciprocity and Retrenched Pension Rights," IZA Discussion Papers 6955, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Aramendia, Miguel, 2006. "Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-239, August.
    5. Matthew Embrey & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2016. "Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion," Working Paper Series 8716, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
    6. Larrea, C. & Ruiz, L., 2015. "Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 125-130.
    7. Harbord, David & Fehr, Nils Henrik von der, 2011. "Coordination, compensation and the expansion of trade: The merchant guilds revisited," MPRA Paper 40992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Harbord, David, 2006. "Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited," MPRA Paper 1889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2015. "Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 171-174.

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