Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited
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More about this item
Keywordscooperation; enforcement; trade; institutions;
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- N75 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Asia including Middle East
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HIS-2007-03-03 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-SOC-2007-03-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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