Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism & the Constitutive Role of Law
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Wang, Ying & Lahr, Henry, 2017.
"Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing efficiency or merely redistributing gains?,"
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- Ding Chen & Simon Deakin & Mathias Siems & Boya Wang, 2016. "Law, Trust & Institutional Change in China: Evidence from Qualitative Fieldwork," Working Papers wp485, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
- Ding Chen & Simon Deakin, 2014. "On Heaven's Lathe: State, Rule of Law, & Economic Development," Working Papers wp464, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
More about this item
KeywordsInstitutions; law; capitalism; theory of the firm; property rights;
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- P1 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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