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Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism & the Constitutive Role of Law

Listed author(s):
  • Simon Deakin
  • David Gindis
  • Geoffrey M. Hodgson
  • Kainan Huang
  • Katharina Pistor

Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies.

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Paper provided by Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge in its series Working Papers with number wp468.

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Date of creation: Mar 2015
Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp468
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk

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