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The Network Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities

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  • Virgile Chassagnon

    (UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

Abstract

This conceptual paper starts with a question regarding the nature of the firm: is the firm a nexus of contracts or a real entity? To answer this question, the article departs from a critique of firm contract theory that usually focuses on moral personification to propose some theoretical foundations of the firm as a real entity. This provides crucial insights for the analysis of modern complex organizations. Then, this paper applies the real entity paradigm to the case of the network firm: is the network firm merely a collection of distinct legal entities or a single real entity? The integrating and unifying role of intra-network power relationships is emphasized, and some legal and economic aspects of the network firm are discussed to clarify the argument that the network firm is a singular real entity composed from distinct legal entities. Considering the network firm as a single real entity has strong policy implications in terms of employment protection rights and politico-legal responsibilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Virgile Chassagnon, 2011. "The Network Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities," Post-Print halshs-01372015, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01372015
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    Cited by:

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    2. Chassagnon, Virgile, 2012. "Une analyse historique de la nature juridique de la firme," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.
    3. Chassagnon, Virgile, 2014. "Consummate cooperation in the network-firm: Theoretical insights and empirical findings," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 260-274.
    4. Virgile Chassagnon, 2014. "Toward a Social Ontology of the Firm: Reconstitution, Organizing Entity, Institution, Social Emergence and Power," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 197-208, October.
    5. Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "Pouvoir et coopération dans la firme et entre les firmes," Post-Print halshs-00818301, HAL.
    6. Ivan Rodrigo Rizzo Dias & George Bedinelli Rossi, 2017. "How far is World Champion from World Class? Institutional effects on a Brazilian non-profit sports organization," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 14(Special I), pages 24-44, January.

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