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Pouvoir et coopération dans la firme et entre les firmes

Listed author(s):
  • Virgile Chassagnon


    (ESDES - École de management de Lyon - Université Catholique de Lyon)

In this article, the objective is triple. First of all, we propose a renewed theoretical framework of power relationships, which takes into account certain approaches to organization theory (notably the resource dependence-based view), in order to help to fill the conceptual vacuum left by the theorists of the firm. Then, it is argued that power represents the methodological key needed by economists to analyze the emergence of intra-firm cooperation and of collective social identity in the employment relationship. Lastly, the focus is on the analysis of inter-firm cooperation (subcontracting relationship) to put forward the cohesive role of power in the network-firm and to compare the internal and external governance structures of power relationships.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00818301.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2012
Publication status: Published in Économies et sociétés, Développement, croissance et progrès - Presses de l'ISMEA - Paris, 2012, Série Economie du Travail (AB), pp.1183-1210
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00818301
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  1. Virgile Chassagnon, 2010. "Firme (-réseau) et relations de pouvoir : une analyse théorique," Post-Print halshs-01371993, HAL.
  2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
  3. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 16, pages 267-297 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  4. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
  5. John Davis, 2006. "Social identity strategies in recent economics," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 371-390.
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  7. Virgile Chassagnon, 2011. "Organisation et institution: vers une socioe´conomie de la firme?," Post-Print halshs-01371977, HAL.
  8. Virgile Chassagnon, 2011. "The law and economics of the modern firm: a new governance structure of power relationships," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 25-50.
  9. Virgile Chassagnon, 2011. "The Network Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities," Journal of Economic Issues, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 45(1), pages 113-136, March.
  10. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
  11. Baudry, Bernard & Chassagnon, Virgile, 2010. "The close relation between organization theory and Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics: a theory of the firm perspective," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(04), pages 477-503, December.
  12. Silvia Sacchetti & Roger Sugden, 2003. "The Governance of Networks and Economic Power: The Nature and Impact of Subcontracting Relationships," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 669-692, December.
  13. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-198, Spring.
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