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Optimal International Trade Agreements And Dispute Settlement Procedures

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  • LUDEMA, R.D.

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  • Ludema, R.D., 1990. "Optimal International Trade Agreements And Dispute Settlement Procedures," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. DeMarzo, P., 1988. "Coalitions and Sustainable Social Norms in Repeated Games," Papers 529, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
    2. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 215-248.
    3. Hungerford, Thomas L., 1991. "GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 357-369.
    4. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Jagdish Bhagwati & Murray C. Kemp, 1969. "Ranking of Tariffs under Monopoly Power in Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 330-335.
    6. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    7. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    8. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, pages 67-96.
    9. Edward Tower, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 623-630.
    10. Jones, Ronald W, 1969. "Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 418-424.
    11. Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo, 1974. "The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under retaliation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 295-298.
    12. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 779-795.
    13. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    14. T. de Scitovszky, 1942. "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 89-110.
    15. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
    16. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
    17. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 190-214.
    18. Riezman, Raymond, 1991. "Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 267-283.
    19. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "Gatt, Dispute Settlement And Cooperation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 151-170, July.
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