Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: the dark side of public financing
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- Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2020. "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 769-820, June.
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Cited by:
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Miguel Ginés, 2019.
"Strategic Ethics: Altruism without the Other-Regarding Confound,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 967-998.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Miguel Ginés, 2019. "Strategic Ethics: Altruism without the Other-regarding Confound," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-13, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Nikolaos Georgantzis & Miguel Ginés, 2019. "Strategic Ethics: Altruism without the Other-Regarding Confound," Post-Print hal-02512373, HAL.
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Keywords
Sequential investment; Laboratory experiment; Moral hazard; Principal-Agent.;JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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