A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
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References listed on IDEAS
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-1098, July.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- James M. Malcomson, 2016.
"Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
- James Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," Economics Series Working Papers 633, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James Malcomson, 2015. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5462, CESifo Group Munich.
- Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe & Schilizzi, Steven & Breustedt, Gunnar, 2011. "Auctioning Outcome-Based Conservation Contracts," 51st Annual Conference, Halle, Germany, September 28-30, 2011 114523, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
More about this item
KeywordsIncentive Contracts; Dynamic Contracting; Commitment; Partition Equilib-rium; Ratchet Effect; Bunching;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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