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Commonp-Belief: The General Case

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  • Kajii, Atsushi
  • Morris, Stephen

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  • Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "Commonp-Belief: The General Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:73-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, August.
    3. Monderer Dov & Samet Dov, 1995. "Stochastic Common Learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 161-171, May.
    4. Sonsino, Doron, 1995. ""Impossibility of speculation" theorems with noisy information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 406-423.
    5. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Common knowledge with probability 1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 237-245, June.
    6. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boris Salazar & Maria del Pilar Castillo, 2003. "Rationality, preferences and irregular war," Colombian Economic Journal, Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Economicas, Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Universidad de Antioquia, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Valle, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, vol. 1(1), pages 15-33, December.
    2. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019. "Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 73-82.
    3. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (August 2006, with George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 279, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    6. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu, 2012. "Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 198-216.
    8. Stefan Pitschner & Kristoffer Nimark, 2015. "State-Dependent Media Focus: Measurement and Economic Implications," 2015 Meeting Papers 1030, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December.
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Coordination and Policy Traps," NBER Working Papers 9767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Cy Maor & Eilon Solan, 2015. "Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 321-346, May.

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