Rationality, preferences and irregular war
We suppose that civilians under threat prefer certain situations within a context of irregular war and endangered survival; they will prefer those situations associated with greater probabilities of survival. Using lexicographical preferences and belief systems, we have shown that civilians will choose not to remain in situations having a lower probability of survival. Linking into social networks allows for shorter deliberation processes, lower decision costs and faster convergence towards collective decision-making. Civilian displacement thus becomes the outcome of a rational decision-making procedure
Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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"Learning, Network Formation and Coordination,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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