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Delta-Epsilon-Common Knowledge and Quantitative Agreement Theorems

Author

Listed:
  • Christina Pawlowitsch
  • Stefan Schrott
  • Daniel Toneian

Abstract

Aumann defined common knowledge mathematically and established his now famous Agreement Theorem. We present a novel approach to quantifying how close individuals are to commonly knowing events, $(\delta,\epsilon)$-common knowledge, which is defined for any (and not just countable) probability spaces, and provide quantitative versions of the key results in this field. Specifically, we do this for Aumann's Agreement Theorem and Nielsen's extension thereof to random variables, as well as for the setting in which posteriors are communicated back and forth between individuals. Our results apply in particular to noisy communication settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina Pawlowitsch & Stefan Schrott & Daniel Toneian, 2026. "Delta-Epsilon-Common Knowledge and Quantitative Agreement Theorems," Papers 2606.11902, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2606.11902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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