The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
A model of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information is analyzed where, if an agreement is not reached, the agents go to court. A "deadline effect" emerges where much settlement occurs just prior to the trial, and many cases proceed to court. If fixed costs are incurred during each bargaining period, a "U-shaped" pattern of settlement emerges. These patterns persist in the limit as the time between offers approaches zero. A model with an endogenous trial date is also considered, and it is shown that even with complete information, there exist inefficient equilibria where disputes are resolved in court.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:1:p:93-108.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.