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The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo
  • Yi, Jong Goo

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo & Yi, Jong Goo, 1993. "The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 399-424, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:399-424
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    Cited by:

    1. CHOI, Jay Pil & GERLACH, Heiko, 2015. "A model of patent trolls," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-9, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
    3. Éric Langlais, 2008. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(2), pages 191-218.
    4. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, 2005. "Decision Rules in a Judicial Hierarchy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(2), pages 264-264, June.
    5. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas & Pi-Han Tsai, 2014. "Why Go to Court? Bargaining Failure under the Shadow of Trial with Complete Information," Working Papers 131406, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    6. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Litigation, experimentation, and reputation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 491-502, December.
    7. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Giorgio Rampa & Margherita Saraceno, 2014. "Beliefs and Precedent: The Dynamics of Access to Justice," DEM Working Papers Series 084, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
    9. Anthony Niblett, 2013. "Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 303-330.
    10. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Kathryn Spier & Xinyu Hua, "undated". "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1081, American Law & Economics Association.
    12. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process," NBER Working Papers 9697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Graevenitz, Georg von, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 215, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    14. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Marco, Alan C. & Walsh, Kieran J., 2006. "Bargaining in the shadow of precedent: the surprising irrelevance of asymmetric stakes," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 81, Vassar College Department of Economics.
    16. Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation†Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    17. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.

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