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The discrete bid first auction

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  • Chwe, Michael Suk-Young

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  • Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1989. "The discrete bid first auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 303-306, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:31:y:1989:i:4:p:303-306
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 379-425.
    2. Peter Cramton & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta, 2010. "Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 40-57, March.
    3. Liad Blumrosen & Michal Feldman, 2005. "Implementation with a Bounded Action Space," Discussion Paper Series dp412, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions Be Transparent?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000128, David K. Levine.
    5. Liad Blumrosen & Michal Feldman, 2005. "Implementation with a Bounded Action Space," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000930, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012. "Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.
    7. Li, Zhen & Kuo, Ching-Chung, 2011. "Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 721-729, December.
    8. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    9. Galavotti, Stefano, 2009. "Bilateral trade with apositional traders," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 172-188, September.
    10. JOUNEAU-SION, Frédéric & TORRES, Olivier, 2000. "Auctions with discrete increments: a structural econometric approach based on dominated strategies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Itzhak Rasooly & Carlos Gavidia-Calderon, 2020. "The importance of being discrete: on the inaccuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory," Papers 2006.03016, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    12. Yotam Gafni & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2022. "Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions," Papers 2210.15181, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    13. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2011. "On The Complete Information First-Price Auction And Its Intuitive Solution," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 353-361.
    14. Richard Cox, 2005. "Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions," Microeconomics 0503007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Zhen Li & Ching-Chung Kuo, 2013. "Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 211(1), pages 255-272, December.
    16. Gillen, Philippe, 2019. "Commitment in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-062, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Saeed Alaei & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Rad Niazadeh, 2022. "Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality," Papers 2203.01384, arXiv.org.

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