Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules
The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several selfish agents is considered, where monetary transfers are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproffness, three important properties are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these four criteria cannot be satisfied by any social choice function, that is, a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result is established for nonbossy mechanisms.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Koc University. Intinye 80860. Istanbul Turkey|
Web page: http://case.ku.edu.tr/tr/econ/home
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