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Strategyproof single unit award rules


  • Szilvia Pápai

    () (Department of Finance and Business Economics, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA)


The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several agents is considered, where monetary compensations are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproofness, three properties of social choice functions are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these three additional criteria cannot be satisfied simultaneously. However, any two of the additional criteria can be satisfied. We give characterizations of the classes of strategyproof social choice functions satisfying these three pairs of properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Szilvia Pápai, 2001. "Strategyproof single unit award rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 785-798.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:785-798
    Note: Received: 18 February 1998/Accepted: 15 May 2000

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    2. Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 1998. "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 455-467.
    3. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2004. "Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Surjectivity," Research Memorandum 006, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicolò & Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez, 2013. "Age based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2013-38, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation," Working Papers 33, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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